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Kingsland, Georgia  
November 22, 1960

Honorable John F. Kennedy  
President-Elect  
Palm Beach, Fla.

Dear Jack:

I am taking the liberty of reporting some conversations with callers in New York last week as of possible interest to you.

U.S.-Soviet Relations. On Wednesday, November 16, Ambassador Menshikov brought me a "long message" from Khrushchev. I have had several such messages from K since I visited him in the U.S.S.R. in 1958. The substance was as follows:

K sends you (Stevenson) greetings and regrets that he did not see you in New York during the General Assembly. He says that your activities toward better relations, lessening tensions, are very much appreciated and will always have support in Moscow, etc.

Khrushchev sees a better possibility for fruitful action now, especially in relation to disarmament. He has high hopes that we can reach understandings. War must be avoided. He does not wish to argue about who is stronger, but to reach understandings and cooperate.

Disarmament would settle - basically - everything. It is K's first priority. He agrees we cannot do it overnight, but should lay foundations by agreements "at the top". He urges discussion off the record by letter and representatives - not "on the rostrum with the world as audience." Mr. K. deems it advisable to use not only official channels, because official language has so many "reservations". He wants informal talks with representatives of the new president there or here. When "on the rostrum" we have to repeat "old accusations".

Khrushchev hopes for agreement on nuclear testing "in a short time" after President Kennedy's inauguration. He asked me to tell President Kennedy that the time is coming when it will be "easier to reach an understanding and that he has a sincere desire to do so".

After questioning, Menshikov said K's basic position on disarmament was enunciated in his concluding speech before the U. N. That is not an "ultimatum", however, and "he is ready to hear the other side". If we reach a basic agreement that our objective is complete and general disarmament, any disagreements "can be settled", and they will agree to "any" inspection and control.

As on several previous occasions with me, Ambassador Menshikov became ambiguous when questioned about the form and formality of "basic agreement on disarmament". In response to my request,

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he agreed to give me the fundamentals of basic agreement in the Soviet view. He then asked me to suggest how to do something more effective on all outstanding questions, of which disarmament was the most important to them.

With respect to Berlin - he said the proposals for internationalization of both Berlins was impossible. With respect to China - he said "they could not be helpful" in connection with renunciation of China's claim to Taiwan and that the Chinese would never accept the idea of "two China's". But on the "expansion" of China elsewhere, the Russians would be "glad to help".

Several times he quoted K as wishing me to know that "of course we had different views but they should not endanger the peace", as Mr. Nixon seemed to insist.

Latin-America. My visitor was a friend of fifteen years, Hernan Santa Cruz, of Chile, deputy director of F.A.O. for Latin America and a "liberal". He said the situation was explosive; social unrest and stagnant economy. Last year population increased 2.6 per cent and average per capita income declined .03 per cent. Per capita food production declined 4 per cent and is now lower than before the war. Foreign investment decreased \$300 million.

"The new administration in the U. S. should make clear at outset that it is concerned first of all with the people of Latin America, not just the ruling classes and American business. The Bogata meeting was a beginning, a first recognition by U. S. of the causes and cures for social unrest. The U. S. should favor economic and political integration in Latin America as in Europe. The U. S. should say clearly that it expects taxation and land reform. The Communists are opposing integration and aggravating nationalism, which offers the U. S. an opportunity."

"The non-Communist countries should be prepared to invest \$2 billion dollars annually for five years on a rising scale, following pre-investment surveys by the new bank, the U. N. Special Fund, the OAS and ECLA."

Guinea. You may have heard from Bill Foster about the efforts to persuade Sekou Toure to postpone agreement with the U.S.S.R. on building the Konkure dam until after your administration is in office.

For more than five years I have been concerned with economic development in West Africa. Stanley Osburne, president of Olin-Mathieson, which has a large investment in Guinea, came to see me, as he often does, to report that he has assured Sekou Toure that U. S. aid in financing the dam will be given prompt and sympathetic attention by the new administration. He said he felt he had to say this - even without authority - in order to induce President Sekou Toure to delay his pending agreement with the Communists.

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Forgive this hurried dictation from the "piney woods" of Georgia.

Sincerely yours,



Adlai E. Stevenson

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